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Abstract 
The organization of production in global value chains (GVCs) has been 
accompanied by a rise of informal and insecure work. Yet, the role of labour 
agency has received scant attention in the GVC and related literatures. Selwyn 
(2013) therefore demands to shift attention towards engagement with labour 
movements to identify what he terms ‘labour-led’ social upgrading. 
We engage with this plea by investigating the role of voluntary initiatives 
(VIs) as non-governmental systems of labour regulation in GVCs. The paper 
asks under which conditions VIs with a more active role for labour emerge in 
GVCs. In order to answer this question, we apply Wright’s (2000) theory of 
the factors enabling positive class compromise to a VI that has been 
implemented in the Indonesian sportswear industry: In June 2011, a Protocol 
on Freedom of Association (FoA) was signed by Indonesian trade unions, 
large Indonesian manufacturers and major multinational brands. 
Based on the analysis of this case, we show that, while the spatial 
dispersion of production has weakened state mechanisms for the guarantee of 
labour rights, new pressure points for labour have also emerged, e.g. brands’ 
reputation or just-in-time production. Besides, new possibilities for 
transnational labour networks have opened that strengthen workers’ 
associational power. Moreover, GVCs fragment capital in different factions, 
such as producers and brands. Their material concerns are not necessarily 
congruent. Workers’ movements might be able to benefit from such divergent 
interests. We conclude that if VIs are to create conditions under which decent 
work can be strengthened, the involvement and strength of local labour 
organizations is required and producers’ and/or buyers’ dependence on 
workers’ cooperation may act as a catalyst. 
Keywords 
Freedom of Association Protocol, global value chains, Indonesia, labour-led 
social upgrading, sportswear industry, trade unions. 
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Voluntary initiatives in global value chains1 
Towards labour-led social upgrading? 
1 Towards labour-led social upgrading in globalized 
production 
The past two decades have seen a multiplication of the volumes of world 
merchandise exports and international foreign investment flows (UNCTAD, 
2012: 24; WTO, 2012: 19). This increase in the quantity of international trade 
and investment volumes, amongst others, has been the consequence of a 
qualitative shift in the global economy, namely the increase of fragmentation of 
production and its relocation across international borders. This shift has been 
flanked by market-driven politics, from the economic liberalization in formerly 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, via the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to the financialization of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). 
The governance of this process has been conceptualized in the scholarly 
literature on global value chains (GVCs) and related concepts (for a critical 
overview, see Newman, 2012)2. Yet, while globalization of production in 
GVCs has been accompanied by a rise of informal and insecure work across 
different regions of the world, even in formal establishments (ILO, 2002: 35-
7), the role of labour has received scant attention in the GVC literature. Due to 
their focus on the vertical nature of globalized production networks and the 
role of the firm therein, GVC studies have tended to turn a blind eye to 
horizontal factors determining outcomes (Newman, 2012: 160), such as 
employment access and labour conditions (Merk, 2007; Selwyn, 2013). 
Early exceptions cautiously conclude that the process of firm upgrading in 
developing country suppliers that is central to many GVC studies is not 
necessarily paralleled by improvements in labour conditions (Knorringa and 
Pegler, 2006: 475). More recently, scholars have addressed the labour blindness 
of the concept of upgrading by distinguishing between and investigating the 
relationship between firms’ economic upgrading and social upgrading, i.e. 
workers’ labour conditions (e.g. Barrientos et al., 2011; Milberg and Winkler, 
2011). Going beyond the upgrading hypothesis and informed by, amongst 
others, a labour process perspective, Pegler et al. (2011: 116) argue in the case 
of agricultural value chains that ‘the marginalized position of the rural 
                                                
1 We are grateful for stimulating comments of participants of the session on ‘The 
Missing Link - Integrating Labour with Global Value Chains’ during the 2013 
International Labour Process Conference, New Brunswick, the Inaugural Civic 
Innovation Research Initiative (CIRI) Forum ‘Theories and Practice in Civic 
Innovation’, The Hague as well as during a CIRI seminar in January 2014. All 
remaining errors are solely ours. 
2 For the purpose of this paper, we use the term GVCs, rather than related concepts, 
e.g. global commodity chains or global production networks. This is due to the 
prominence that the term has gained since the late 1990s in policy and academic 
circles (Newman, 2012: 155). 
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workforce and the resulting low labour costs have been instrumental in 
securing companies’ and macro-economic competitiveness’. Taking a Marxian 
perspective, Selwyn (2013: 87-8) therefore demands to shift attention towards 
engagement with labour movements to identify what he terms ‘labour-led’ 
social upgrading. 
This turn in the academic debate follows the changed direction of labour 
activists’ demands. Trade unions, NGOs and other advocates of labour rights, 
have long criticized poor and insecure labour conditions as a result of a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in globalized and more competitive production networks since the 
1990s, though. Lead firms in such chains, in particular, have responded to this 
critique with the development and implementation of different types of private 
sector voluntary initiatives (VIs) for corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
which have gradually involved a wider range of stakeholders (Newitt, 2012). 
Yet, the widespread failure of these initiatives to effectively improve labour 
conditions in GVCs has lead activists and scholars to call for corporate social 
accountability as a more hybrid combination of demands for ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
law targeting corporations, involving a more representative cross-section of 
civil society actors and coalitions, especially workers’ voices (Utting, 2008: 968-
72). 
Based on a review of relevant academic literature and media reports as 
well as on selected qualitative interviews with trade unionists, we engage with 
Selwyn’s plea for an analysis of ‘labour-led’ social upgrading by investigating 
the role of voluntary initiatives (VIs) as non-governmental systems of labour 
regulation in GVCs. The paper asks under which conditions VIs with a more 
active role for labour emerge in GVCs. In order to answer this question, we 
apply Wright’s (2000) theory of the factors enabling positive class compromise 
to the Freedom of Association Protocol, a VI that has been implemented in 
the Indonesian sportswear industry since 2011. Freedom of association (FoA) 
and collective bargaining (CB) are two key labour rights that are enshrined in 
international law. They are often referred to as ‘enabling rights’, implying that, 
when these rights are respected, workers can use them to ensure that other 
labour standards are upheld. While they often formally acknowledge the 
relevance of FoA and CB, VIs in labour-intensive sectors such as the 
sportswear industry have a notoriously poor record on implementing and 
monitoring these collective labour rights (e.g. Frenkel, 2001; Manic, 2004; Play 
Fair, 2008). The Indonesian FoA Protocol represents an ‘extreme case’ of a 
structural commitment to strengthening labour. Its study might contain lessons 
for forms of non-governmental labour regulation that are less far-going in their 
concessions in favour of labour (Patton, 1990: 169-71). 
The next session critically reviews empirical and theoretical critiques of 
VIs. It identifies a lack of analyses of the contributions of workers’ collective 
organizations to VIs. Section 3 outlines Wright’s (2000) theory of positive class 
compromise which puts workers’ collective agency at the centre of the analysis. 
Section 4 introduces the background of union repression and workers’ 
struggles in Indonesia's export industries, which led to the emergence of the 
FoA Protocol. Features and scope of this VI are presented in section 5. It is 
subsequently discussed in the light of the theoretical framework in section 6. In 
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the conclusion, we derive elements for labour-led chain governance from the 
analysis of the Indonesian case and provide an outlook for GVC-related 
research and intervention. 
2 Why voluntary initiatives have failed to deliver decent 
work3 
With O’Rourke (2003: 2), we define VIs as non-governmental systems of 
labour regulation. Within this container concept, one finds heterogeneous 
forms of private chain governance. They include individual company codes, 
industry-led platforms and multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) (Newitt, 2012: 
6-9). Notwithstanding this differentiation, we zoom in on key commonalities. 
VIs have often set out to compensate for deficits in national governments’ 
capacity (or willingness) to regulate globalized labour relations in production 
networks. Their rise since the 1990s can not be understood outside the neo-
liberal drive towards marketization (Bartley, 2003). It can be related to business 
interests’ perception of VIs as ‘non-threatening as [they] respected the central 
tenets of neo-liberalism centred on FDI, export-orientation, privatization and 
downsizing of the state’ (Utting, 2000: 4). Initially, VIs were – at least in part – 
a response to activists’ campaigns against sweatshop conditions in globalized 
production. Later, ‘the balance between confrontation and collaboration 
shifted in favour of the latter’ (Utting, 2008: 960): Many civil society 
organizations have discovered that lobbying businesses can, for certain 
objectives, be more effective and visible than their traditional arena – lobbying 
the state. They have become involved in MSIs in an effort to move from 
corporate self-regulation to co-regulation. This shows that the proliferation of 
VIs is driven by a wide range of stakeholders, which have different interests 
and contrasting expectations of the purpose of these instruments (Jenkins, 
2002: 13). They can therefore best be understood as objects of political 
contestation and strategic framing between different social forces searching for 
ways to fill the regulatory vacuum (Bartley, 2003: 437). 
VIs have led to raised awareness of exploitative labour conditions among 
different actors in GVCs. Besides, they have contributed to an increased 
endorsement of internationally recognized labour rights by business. This has 
been further reinforced through the recently adopted ‘Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights for implementing the UN ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework’ (UN Human Rights Council, 2011). 
Despite such increased discursive endorsement by the business 
community, labour activists and scholars have questioned the effectiveness of 
VIs to guarantee decent work in GVCs. A recent overview, prepared as a 
background document for the World Bank’s flagship publication World 
Development Report 2013, cautiously states that it ‘[…] is difficult to ascertain 
the long-term impact of voluntary initiatives on working conditions in global 
supply chains’ (Newitt, 2012: 4). While some observers perceive positive 
                                                
3 This section draws on Merk (2007). 
8 
 
effects, in particular regarding health and safety standards, working hours and 
payment of the minimum wage for formally employed workers (Barrientos and 
Smith, 2007), an overwhelming number of factory level case studies show their 
operational limitations. Utting (2008: 963) summarizes that non-governmental 
systems of labour regulation have largely failed in terms of scale, scope and the 
development of effective instruments: Only a small fraction of MNEs, let 
alone the broader business community, actively engages with VIs. Commercial 
logic and stipulations of VIs contradict each other where MNEs increase 
pressures on their suppliers and their subcontractors to raise labour standards 
while simultaneously demanding lower prices and shorter lead times. The 
implementation of labour codes is comparatively weak on enabling rights, such 
as freedom of association (FoA) and collective bargaining. Moreover, VIs have 
been shown to neglect the situation of non-core, women and migrant workers 
in the supply chain (e.g. Barrientos, 2008). 
This lack of effectiveness in producing positive outcomes for workers can 
be related to inherent flaws in VIs’ instruments, in particular, factory 
monitoring systems (Brown, 2013). First, monitors often lack expertise and 
authority to identify shortcomings and to go beyond ‘ticking the boxes’. 
Second, monitoring and auditing has itself become a multi-billion industry in 
which auditors follow the business logic of trying to maintain good 
relationships with their most valued customers. This means that auditing 
companies are likely to incorporate their clients’ expectations in their 
implementation strategies, and will be hesitant to openly criticize their clients. 
Third, a very large group of producers actually invest much of their time and 
effort in falsifying reports and influencing auditing visits. 
These operational shortcomings are caused by the common dominance of 
a commercial logic in the design of VIs (Brown, 2013: 4). Taylor (2011: 449) 
points out that ‘[…] the implementation of labour codes appears to clash with 
one of the fundamental driving forces of the internationalisation of 
production: namely, the relocation of capital to access labour forces that are 
both short of basic rights and that can be subjected to intense work routines in 
poor labouring conditions over an extended working week for low wages.’ 
Moreover, a near total lack of worker participation at the plant-level, excluding 
the people with the greatest knowledge of the problems on the job and the 
greatest stake in improvements is a crucial problem in the design of VIs 
(Brown, 2013: 4), besides their wide-spread lack of enforcement mechanisms 
and the absence of transparency. 
Addressing the above-mentioned weaknesses in a next generation of VIs 
will be contingent on a different role for labour. So far, an instrumental and 
passive role is commonly allocated to labour in GVCs (Selwyn, 2013: 76-9): 
Labour is an instrumental production factor for MNEs’ accumulation 
strategies. If covered by VIs, workers become often mere passive objects for 
social auditing. Even when trade unions or other labour organizations are 
represented in MSIs, their role is commonly marginal. A ‘sea-change in the 
international business model and the active participation of informed and 
empowered workers’ (Brown, 2013: 5) is therefore required. In order to detect 
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promising avenues for governance of labour relations in globalized production, 
an analytical framework is required that puts workers’ agency at the centre. 
3 How positive class compromise might emerge 
Wright’s (2000) theory of the factors enabling positive class compromise offers 
a contribution to fill this conceptual gap. He explains how the position of 
labour may improve as a result of mutual cooperation between increasingly 
powerful workers associations and capitalists. Wright departs from traditional 
Marxian assumptions when he sees antagonism between capitalists’ 
commercial logic and workers’ interest in decent labour conditions as the key 
feature of capitalist societies. Yet, he shows that, despite opposed class 
interests, coalitions implying benefits for labour may be possible. VIs can 
potentially capitalize on the identification of such possibilities of positive class 
compromise.  
Figure 1 
Working class strength and capitalist class interests 
 
           Source: Wright (2000: 960) 
Wright (2000: 962) distinguishes workers’ ‘associational power’, i.e. forms 
of power resulting from the formation of workers’ collective organizations, 
from their ‘structural power’ as ‘power that results simply from the location of 
workers within the economic system’. He defines positive class compromise as 
‘mutual cooperation between opposing classes’ that leads to improved 
outcomes for both workers and capitalists (Wright, 2000: 958). It involves 
concessions in favour of the interests of people in the opposing class (Wright, 
2000: 964). His central argument is that the possibilities for stable, positive 
class compromise generally hinge on the relationship between the associational 
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power of the working class and the material interests of capitalists. While 
orthodox Marxists and neoclassical economists assume an inverse relationship 
between these two variables, he postulates a curvilinear reverse-J relationship 
(Figure 1): Capitalist-class interests are initially adversely affected by rising 
working-class power. Yet, once working- class power crosses some threshold, 
it begins to have positive effects on capitalists' interests (Wright, 2000: 958-9). 
This happens when associational power of workers may help capitalists to 
solve certain kinds of collective action and coordination problems (Wright, 
2000: 978). 
Wright differentiates these interests of capital threatened or facilitated by 
increasing working-class power for the spheres of politics, exchange, and 
production (Wright, 2000: 978-85). Collective action or coordination problems 
in the sphere of exchange that well-organized workers’ associations may help 
to solve refer, for instance, to demand generation or wage restraints under 
conditions of tight labour markets. In the sphere of production, stronger 
works councils enhance the possibility of more effective involvement of 
workers in various forms of creative problem solving. At the political level, 
organizational links between the labour movement and leftist parties may be 
critical for stability, paving the way to high capacity utilization, low levels of 
unemployment, and relatively high productivity growth. 
While his game-theoretic model assumes a closed economy, Wright (2000: 
995-9) also explores the impact of globalization on the possibilities of positive 
class compromise to emerge. He concludes that, in the context of GVCs, there 
will be a tendency for positive class compromise to be more heavily 
concentrated within the sphere of production (Wright, 2000: 998-9). The 
above inventory of capitalists’ interests in cooperation with the working class 
in the spheres of exchange and politics are unlikely to apply to GVCs. For 
instance, export-oriented producers in the global South are unlikely to seek 
workers’ cooperation for ‘Keynesian effects’, i.e. the ability to sell their 
products. This is because workers in these factories are, so far, commonly not 
identical with the consumers of the export products they manufacture (Wright, 
2000: 996). At the level of politics, reduced fiscal autonomy of the state 
resulting from increased globalization reduces the benefits from policies aimed 
at influencing aggregate demand as well as the capacity of the state to sustain 
them (Wright, 2000: 998). 
Yet, capitalists’ interest ‘in being able to reliably elicit cooperation, 
initiative, and responsibility from employees’ at the shop floor (Wright, 2000: 
981) might even increase under conditions of the intensified competition that 
comes from increased globalization (Wright, 2000: 996). The downside of 
these new opportunities might be an intensification of dualist labour markets 
with privileged segments of the labour force, in a position to forge class 
compromises while others are not (Wright, 2000: 999). 
We argue that Wright’s theory might contain lessons for labour-led social 
upgrading in globalized production. In the following, we therefore apply his 
analytical lens to a deeper understanding of the processes that have led to the 
recent emergence of the FoA Protocol in the athletic footwear industry in 
Indonesia. 
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4 Union repression and workers’ struggles in Indonesia's 
export industries 
Labour-intensive industries like garment and footwear manufacturing arrived 
in Indonesia at the end of the 1980s when the Suharto regime shifted towards 
an export-driven industrial strategy. South Korean manufacturers, in particular, 
started to move factories towards Indonesia: At home, they were confronted 
with intense working class struggles due to the 1987 democratization 
movement and increasingly powerful unions capable of negotiating higher 
wages (Merk, 2011). 
Overall, athletic sportswear had changed from a small, specialist market 
into a mainstream fashion product since the 1970s. Its market is highly 
concentrated. Dominated by a few well-known brands, such as Nike, Adidas, 
Puma, New Balance and Asics, the twenty largest companies represent over 92 
per cent of the global wholesale market (SGI, 2003). Practically all of the 
brand-named corporations have long disassociated themselves from direct 
strategic control over labour-intensive production and large workforces, 
despite maintaining operational control over production processes through 
conceptualization, design, quality control, etc. (Ietto-Gilles, 2002: 54). Actual 
production is now being performed by manufacturers operating in low-wage 
countries. There have been two major shifts in the spatial organization of 
athletic footwear production. In the 1960s, Western corporations started 
outsourcing production on the basis of wage differentials towards Taiwan and 
South Korea. Production moved to a second tier of developing countries, 
namely China, Indonesia and Vietnam, at the end of the 1980s. These three 
countries still count for over 90 per cent of the global athletic footwear 
production (Merk, 2011: 81-7; UBS Warburg, 19 May 2003). 
All main producer countries have a history of severely curtailed collective 
labour rights. In China, workers are legally restricted to form independent 
unions. Unions have to be approved by the state-controlled All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). As a result, workers are mostly 
represented by unelected state union officials who have been criticized for 
doing little to improve working conditions or protecting workers’ rights. 
Similarly, in Vietnam, workers are neither free to join unions nor form unions 
of their own choosing. Unions registered at workplaces must be affiliated with 
the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL). Although, compared 
to its Chinese counterpart, the VGCL has established a more independent 
position from governmental activities and approval in representing workers 
(Clarke et al., 2007), most work place unions turn out to be ‘an arm of 
management, rather than representing workers’ interests’ (Wang, 2005: 49). 
In Indonesia, the Suharto regime (1967-1998) strongly restricted trade 
union activity and the employee’s voice in the workplace. The only union that 
could legally operate was the Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (SPSI, All-
Indonesia Workers’ Union), but like those operating in China and Vietnam 
today, it was ‘primarily an instrument of control rather than a representative 
body’ (Ford, 2005: 200). However, many of the newly recruited workers 
established their own associations, organized strikes and mass demonstrations. 
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The growth in unrest was concentrated in large, multinational-owned industries 
geared towards export production in the garment, textile and footwear sectors 
(Silvey, 2003: 136). 
Workers who set up new (underground/semi-illegal) trade unions or 
organized strikes were arrested and imprisoned. The army often intervened in 
these conflicts. In 1991, when strikes occurred at two Korean factories the 
Indonesian daily Media Indonesia published a three-day report on shoe factories. 
The second-day headline read: ‘World Shoe Giants Rape Worker Rights’. The 
subsequent stories detailed a range of labour rights abuses, poor conditions 
and abusive management. These struggles had an impact beyond the local level 
when Western media began to pick up the reports. This resulted in a first wave 
of publications on poor working conditions at Nike suppliers in media outside 
Indonesia. Around this time, the contacts between local labour NGOs and 
transnational anti-sweatshop networks such as Oxfam Australia, the European 
Clean Clothes Campaigns (CCC), the US-American United Students Against 
Sweatshop (USAS), the global union federation IndustriALL and others 
became more intense. Indonesian workers organizations have had more access 
to such transnational networks compared to their fellows in China and 
Vietnam, who must deal with a general lack of political structures open to their 
cause. Anti-Nike campaigns were launched in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Italy. Meanwhile, dozens of strikes at athletic footwear factories were reported 
throughout the 1990s, often followed by dismissal, arrest and violence. Labour 
NGOs played an important role in the reconstruction of the Indonesian labour 
movement during the 1990s when Suharto’s government’s prevented workers 
from effectively pursuing their interests within the state-sanctioned union and 
prohibited them from organizing meaningful alternatives within the official 
industrial relations system (Ford, 2006: 175).  
This international collaboration was continued in the post-Suharto era, e.g. 
in the Play Fair campaign. Launched in connection with the 2004 Olympic 
Games held in Athens, this campaign sought to push sportswear and athletic 
footwear companies, the International Olympics Committee and its national 
organising committees, as well as national governments to take concrete 
measures to address violations of workers’ rights in supply chains. The 
campaign consisted of an alliance of Oxfams, Global Unions (including the 
then ICFTU and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' 
Federation (ITGLWF, today: IndustriALL), the Clean Clothes Campaign and 
their constituent organizations worldwide. In the six-month run-up to the 2004 
Olympic Games, the campaign organizers estimated that 500 local events such 
as demonstrations, protest actions, picket lines, etc. had taken place. More than 
500,000 people had signed a petition in support of the campaign. Various 
Indonesian unions involved in the campaign were affiliated to partners abroad 
and had worked together in the Play Fair campaign. For instance, Garteks - 
Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (GARTEKS-SBSI, Federation of Garment, 
Crafting, Textile, Leather and Shoes) and Serikat Pekerja Nasional (SPN, 
National Labor Union) are affiliated to the ITGLWF. Kongres Aliansi Serikat 
Buruh Indonesia (KASBI, The Indonesian Workers’ Alliance Congress) and 
13 
 
Gabungan Serikat Buruh Indonesia (GSBI, The Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions) has had a long-standing relation with Oxfam and Oxfam Australia. 
The end of the Suharto regime in 1998 removed earlier restrictions on 
trade union establishment when the government ratified eight ILO 
conventions, including those guaranteeing FoA and CB. They were translated 
into the domestic Trade Union Law, No 21/2000, which permitted multiple 
union structures in the form of national federations and larger confederations 
(Manning, 2010). With these political barriers lifted, Indonesia witnessed a 
steep rise in the number of trade unions. By August 2000, 24 national trade 
unions and over 10,000 enterprise unions had registered with the Department 
of Manpower (Ford, 2009: 161). This rise meant increased pressure for 
compliance with labour rights and standards. Indeed, after long negotiations, 
the law No 13/2003 was passed. It covers a wide range of labour protection 
issues that were previously scattered over various decrees and laws as well as 
setting new standards, e.g. regarding the protection of female workers and 
procedures and compensation for lay offs and dismissals (Manning, 2010). Yet, 
these political and legal changes did not end the violence, intimidation and the 
imprisonment of outspoken workers or union officials (Connor and Dent, 
2006; ICFTU, 2003; ITGLWF, 2011; Quinn, 2003). 
The process of democratization or Reformasi heralded a shift from state 
union repression to (state-tolerated) repression by private firms. Employers 
often use acts of discrimination against union members or workers suspected 
of engaging in organising activities. This can range from withholding 
promotions to intimidation and outright violence. In other cases, factory 
management seeks to interfere with union activities, for example by denying 
access to office space, refusing trade union representatives to carry out union 
duties, or simply by refusing to engage in social dialogue and collective 
bargaining (ITGLWF, 2011). While state-sponsored violence through the 
military reduced under Reformasi, employers often mobilize local criminal gangs, 
so-called preman, as ‘industrial instruments’ to constrain labour activism, 
intimidate union activists and to break-up strike actions (Warouw, 2006: 203, 
see also Merk and Mufakhir, 2014). 
As a result, few opportunities exist for trade unions to engage in 
(meaningful) collective bargaining. Management often simply refuses to 
negotiate with elected worker representatives. The increased use of short-term 
contracts is another problem Indonesian unions are facing. In some sportswear 
factories, up to 80 per cent of workers is employed on a temporary basis 
(ITGLWF, 2011: 2; World Solidarity, 2009). Employers often refuse to renew 
contracts of union members. A ‘flexibility regime’ has been created, centered 
on short-term contracts, that undermines trade union activities. Indrasari and 
Nugroho (2008: 9) conclude that ‘[i]n the current labour climate, joining a 
union is considered to be a threat to ongoing job security, rather than a viable 
way of defending one's rights’. 
Yet, despite continued repression, Indonesian trade unions are the most 
militant in the region. Therefore, workers’ struggles often escalate before even 
an attempt at finding a resolution can be mounted in the context of existing 
VIs. The FoA Protocol described in the following section addresses this 
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situation by paving the way to a more effective guarantee of collective labour 
rights at the firm level. 
5 Negotiating an alternative model: the Freedom of  
Association Protocol 
On June 6, 2011, a protocol on FoA was signed by Indonesian trade unions, 
large Indonesian sportswear manufacturers and multinational sportswear 
brands, including Adidas, Nike, Puma, Pentland, New Balance and Asics 
(Gardener, 2012). Adidas, a company with more market power than others, 
took on a leading role in the negotiations and lobbied other buyers. Four 
manufacturers, all major suppliers of main sportswear brands, took part in the 
negotiation process: PT Adis, PT Tungex, PT Nikomas and PT Panarub. 
Representatives from five different Indonesian unions led the negotiations – 
GSBI, SPN, GARTEKS-SBSI, KASBI and Serikat Pekerja Tekstil, Sandang dan 
Kulit (SPTSK, the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Workers Union). Except for 
SPTSK, these were all unions that have been involved in the Play Fair 
campaign and have been working with Oxfam Australia, ITGLWF and CCC 
on solidarity actions around individual factory disputes. These international 
organizations played an important role at the background of the negotiation 
process. 
The ratification was one of the results of sportswear campaigns around 
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. A report released by the Play Fair campaign 
just before the Olympics had identified a lack of respect for FoA and the right 
to bargain collectively as a major hurdle affecting manufacturing workers in 
supply chains that need to be overcome (Play Fair, 2008). This report and the 
detailed targets formulated in it formed the basis of a three day long 
conference in Hong Kong in June 2008 in which both the Play Fair Alliance 
and the main brands driving the sporting industry participated to discuss 
workers' wages and working conditions. At this meeting, it was agreed that, in 
order to find solutions to workplace issues, the discussion needed to move 
from a global to the national level. A joint working group was formed to 
advance work at the national level. Indonesia was chosen a good starting point 
due to its significance for sportswear production as well as because of the 
independence of trade unions. This led to a process of negotiations around a 
protocol that provides companies with a set of guidelines on how to uphold 
and respect trade union rights. 
The resulting Protocol establishes practical guidelines to ensure that 
factory workers in Indonesia are able to organize and collectively bargain for 
better conditions in their workplaces (Table 1). The agreement also covers 
areas concerning non-victimization of trade union officers and members as 
well as a non-intervention pledge on the part of employers into trade union 
activities. In addition, the Protocol describes in much more detail than the 
national law (let alone, multinational brands’ VIs) what rights unions can claim 
at the factory level (Table 1). Indonesian union representatives find the 
Protocol to be more detailed than the law, giving more space for workers to 
organize as a result (interview Emelia Yanti, GSBI, October 2011). 
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Table 1 
Rights unions can claim under the Protocol* 
 
Request the release union representatives from their work duties to undertake 
union organizational activities (art. 4.5 & 4.6);  
Make use of company meeting space for union activities (art. 5.1a );  
Make use of communication facilities (telephones, fax, internet) (art. 5.1b);  
Make use of company vehicles (art. 5.1c);  
Display their organization’s flag (art. 5.1d); 
Display a union signboard (art. 5.1e);  
Receive visitors from union organizations outside the company (art. 5.1f);  
Request company assistance in deducting union fees (art. 5.1g);  
Have access to a furnished room that can be used as a union secretariat  
(art. 5.2a);  
Negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (art. 6); 
Distribute union information to workers (art. 7.1); 
Attach information to public notice boards without prior permission (art. 7.2a); 
Support and facilitate union activities during working hours, by allowing routine 
scheduled meetings, ad hoc meetings, and union education activities 
(art.5.3); 
* These rights can be subject to certain conditions such as, for example, availability and 
regulations and procedures that apply to other users within the company.  
See for the precise formulation the Protocol. 
Source: FoA Protocol (2011) 
 
Coverage of the Protocol is wide. The leading sportswear brands have 
signed up to it. Since the global athletic footwear industry, unlike garment 
production, is highly consolidated, these brands together represent over 80 per 
cent of the global wholesale market for athletic footwear. They source an 
estimated 30 per cent of footwear merchandise from Indonesia. Four large 
manufacturers also participated in the negotiation process of the Protocol. For 
instance, PT Nikomas is owned by the world largest footwear manufacturer 
Yue Yuen, listed in Hong Kong. It runs a massive plant in Serang, not far from 
Jakarta, where it employs 70,000 workers in making shoes for Nike, Adidas and 
Puma (Merk, 2008). This makes it possible to make progress on trade union 
rights at a nation-wide instead of a factory-by-factory basis. It has the potential 
to create a more level-playing field amongst sportswear manufacturers in 
Indonesia, some of whom are already applying higher standards than others. 
Unlike most VIs, the Protocol is a negotiated, signed agreement that is 
binding on all parties at all tier 1 factories producing merchandise of the 
signatory sportswear brands in Indonesia. Suppliers are obliged to disseminate 
the content of the Protocol and its implementation to their sub-contractors. 
Further support for the implementation of the protocol through a ‘standard 
operating procedure (SOP) for the FoA Protocol supervision and dispute 
resolution committee’ was negotiated and inaugurated in November 2012. It is 
supposed to result in the setting up of (bipartite) Factory Committees on FoA, 
which are to oversee and report on the implementation of the Protocol 
provision at the factory level; as well as a Tripartite National Committee. The 
latter one includes representation from trade unions, manufacturers and 
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brands. It must provide mechanisms for resolving conflicts that cannot be 
solved at the factory level; conduct and report on investigations; and provide 
recommendations for resolution of the issues for parties at the factory level. 
The SOP and the setting of factory committees and the national committee 
represent an important step in the further implementation of the FoA 
Protocol. 
6 The FoA Protocol as positive class compromise? 
The initial situation of industrial relations in export industries in Indonesia 
outlined in section 4 resembles the stalemate of non-cooperative class relations 
predicted in orthodox Marxian theory. While it is too early to assess the 
effectiveness of the FoA Protocol, against this backdrop, its ratification as such 
is a significant achievement. Yet, it raises the question why capitalists would 
submit to the unattractive option of structural collaboration with labour 
through a VI? Assuming that more general lessons for the emergence of 
labour-led social upgrading in GVCs can be derived from the analysis of this 
case, we have tried to understand this question from the perspective of 
Wright’s theory of positive class compromise. 
As outlined above, from Wright’s perspective, moves towards decent 
work in GVCs hinge on the strength of labour organizations as well as on the 
situations in which capitalists depend on workers’ cooperation for solving 
crucial coordination problems. In this section, we relate the Indonesian case to 
these factors. A first, crucial, observation is that, in GVCs, both working and 
capitalist classes are more differentiated than in Wright’s (2000) stylized model. 
Capitalists include sportswear manufacturers, but also global buyers. Hence, 
not just the interests of capitalists and working class conflict, but buyers’ and 
manufacturers’ concerns are often opposed to each other. For instance, while 
manufacturers might be interested in stable, long-term contractual relations, 
multinational brands might appreciate contractual flexibility. Even within the 
group of buyers, interests are heterogenous. This is exemplified in the position 
that adidas took in contrast to other brands, taking the lead in lobbying for the 
FoA Protocol. What determined the strength of workers’ associations and their 
allies in the negotiations around the FoA Protocol? And why were brands and 
manufacturers interested in its ratification? 
The Indonesian unions’ bargaining power was clearly enhanced by 
international trade union and labour solidarity networks. It seems that this 
process took place in two stages. The Indonesian union movements’ internal 
fissures were bridged through joint engagement in the international Play Fair 
campaign where they collaborated with each other as a result of their affiliation 
to international trade union and labour solidarity networks. This can be seen as 
some form of ‘boomerang advocacy’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1999), which achieves 
progress at the national level via the ‘detour’ of international lobbying. Yet, in 
this case it is not state actors that are successfully lobbied, but the labour 
movement’s internal divisions that are overcome. In a second step, the leverage 
of cross-border anti-sweatshop campaigns upon sportswear brands has been 
crucial in shifting this power balance between capital and labour, since 
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Indonesian unions alone have little capacity to pressurize distant power-
holders. 
The negotiations for the Protocol were rooted in the point of garment 
production in Indonesia. Local trade unions defined priorities, goals and 
targets. Yet, the organization of sportswear production in GVCs has catalysed 
networks of linkages between labour activists in producing countries such as 
Indonesia and in major export destinations like Europe and Australia. Such 
‘glocal bargaining’ is a new example for how workers’ associational power is 
strengthened. Franz (2010, 2012) offers a similar argument, referring to the 
role of international framework agreements for the case of union repression in 
Indian branches of the German retailer Metro. He posits that ‘[…] to develop 
collective power in a global production network, unions have to develop 
strategies that are able to overcome the spatial asymmetry between the 
transnationally organized companies and the place-bound labour’ (Franz, 2010: 
281). He shows how a union’s greater power in the company’s German home 
market was harnessed in order to strengthen workers’ associational power in 
India by means of network relationships. 
While Wright’s model focuses on the role of workers’ associations, he 
concedes that their power may be influenced by the location of labour within 
the economic system, i.e. their structural power (Wright, 2000: 962). The 
present study illustrates this for the case of labour relations in GVCs. 
Globalized just-in-time production, for instance, creates new vulnerabilities for 
local capitalists, such as the adherence to stipulated lead times. These 
vulnerabilities are the flipside of the working classes’ increased structural power 
to stop production and to endanger fulfillment of contractual obligations, 
producers’ reputation as well as future orders as a result. Yet, these power 
potentials can only be actualized through the existence of workers’ associations 
at the level of the firm. With them, a new area of interest in the cooperation of 
the working class emerges, especially for producers (e.g. Selwyn, 2013: 78; 
Silver, 2003: 6).  
Overall, capitalists’ material interests relate to the capture of value of 
production. Yet, as mentioned above this interest might be differentiated 
between different fractions of capital, more specifically between sportswear 
brands and producers, and even between them. Frictions within capital, of 
course, weaken their position in class-based conflict. Therefore, while on the 
whole producers were not interested in the far-going concessions established 
through the FoA Protocol, branded lead firms were in a position to pressurize 
producers. This is probably because the latter’s material interests were directed 
towards ensuring that buyers place stable orders. Besides, as discussed above, 
given the vigilance of Indonesian trade unions, manufacturers can be assumed 
to have an interest in a proactive regime that prevents the escalation of 
industrial struggles and creates the conditions for productivity increases. Strong 
and united unions oriented towards social dialogue rather than industrial action 
have a key role here. Another coordination problem at the level of the sectoral 
labour market that strong unions help to address is the unevenness in 
producers’ commitments to higher labour standards, including collective 
labour rights. Unions’ campaign for an FoA Protocol has catalyzed a more 
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‘level playing field’ for producers where adherence to labour standards does 
not imply a competitive disadvantage for them. 
For the MNEs ordering sportswear from Indonesia, concerns regarding 
their public perception especially in their main markets might have been a 
major motive for their involvement in the negotiations of the FoA protocol. In 
the context of GVCs, such reputational capital is of special significance for 
branded companies, especially in strongly consumer oriented sectors, such as 
retailing, garments and footwear, in its ability to create and capture value 
(Franz, 2010: 283). The Play Fair campaign represented a major threat to that 
reputation as the visibility associated with international sports events also 
makes branded sportswear companies hyper-sensitive to publicity that 
associates their products with exploitation and poor working conditions. Frank 
Henke, adidas’s director of social and environmental affairs, observed: ‘Events 
like the European Championships and the Olympics have drawn us into the 
epicentre of criticism.’ (Reuters, 2004). Brands' reputation is likely to have 
external effects on other buyers in the sector. For instance, media reports of 
union repression in one major brand’s suppliers are likely to influence public 
opinion about sportswear firms more generally. An industry-wide standard on  
Figure 2 
Emergence of the FoA Protocol based on workers’ associational power  
and capitalists interests 
 
Source: authors (based on Wright, 2000) 
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collective labour rights such as the FoA protocol may be able to address and 
internalize negative effects on reputational capital4. Motivating other 
sportswear companies to jointly set up and adhere to such a standard, however, 
is a typical collective action problem. It is a complex problem in that it involves 
getting on board producers at the location from which threats to reputation 
emerge as well as competing brands. Here, strong unions cooperating at an 
industry level and lobbying for an industry-wide standard can act as catalysts to 
solve this coordination problem. Given the structure of the athletic footwear 
chain, Indonesia is the only producing country where such an effort could 
credibly be made due to the lack of independence of Chinese and Vietnamese 
trade unions. This may explain the availability of MNEs sourcing sportswear 
from Indonesia to negotiate a structural strengthening of workers’ associational 
power. The negative externalities of bad media reports on brands’ reputation 
might have motivated an industry leader such as adidas to urge other MNEs to 
come on board and sign the FoA protocol. Firm size – for brands but also for 
producers – probably had a catalyzing effect. The fact that sportswear 
producers in Indonesia are large in comparison with, for instance, garment 
manufacturers in the region catalyses negotiations as less people need to be 
brought around the table. 
7 Conclusion and outlook 
Our analysis of the FoA Protocol in the Indonesian athletic sportswear 
industry from the perspective of Wright’s (2000) theory of positive class 
compromise has shed light on conditions that may enable the emergence of 
non-governmental systems of labour regulation in GVCs with a more active 
role for labour. 
Indonesian workers’ associational power was enhanced through 
transnational labour solidarity networks, yet, five diverse local unions were at 
the forefront of the negotiations for the FoA Protocol. This is reflected in the 
Protocol’s stipulations, which caters to the practical needs of local unions 
rather than referring to abstract principles. The coordination on the labour side 
increased pressure on producers and brands who had a less united and clear 
agenda, but also allowed them to solve their respective collective action 
problems. The FoA Protocol addresses producers’ concerns regarding the 
choking of production through fierce labour struggles. It also ensures that 
defecting producers do not achieve competitive advantage at the expense of 
collective labour rights. For sportswear brands, the Protocol offers a unique 
opportunity to protect and increase their reputational capital as a business 
community that is ‘playing fair’ with regards to collective labour rights. Overall, 
it allows actors in the athletic footwear industry in Indonesia to move from a 
situation of confrontation to one that has the potential to catalyse cooperation. 
We therefore consider the Protocol an instance of labour-led social upgrading 
                                                
4 Potoski and Prakash (2005) demonstrate this for the case of private environmental 
standards. 
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in GVCs as it ‘prioritizes workers’ struggles to ameliorate their conditions 
through collective action’ (Selwyn, 2013: 88). 
Wright’s simplified concept of class has sharpened our focus on key 
factors leading to the emergence of VIs with a more active role for labour. Yet, 
as shown above, extensions are necessary to capture the realities of GVCs. 
Moving beyond the polarized relation between capitalists and workers to a 
recognition of more diverse actors has allowed us to explain the strengthening 
of workers’ associational power through the support of transnational labour 
solidarity networks, a potential specific to the realities of globalized production. 
A second extension relates to the sphere in which positive class compromise 
takes place. Wright predicts (2000: 996) that under conditions of globalization, 
the most likely sphere for positive class compromise is production. The case 
study exemplifies, though, that, in GVCs, negotiations between unions and 
athletic sportswear producers are enmeshed in the negotiations with brands. 
This means that the negative effect of globalized production on the 
possibilities for positive class comprise assumed by Wright has to be qualified 
by new collective action problems specific to trade relations in globalized 
production. One of them is the challenge for highly visible brands selling 
consumer goods to protect their reputational capital. As shown above, this may 
offer new opportunities for compromise between capitalists and workers. 
Lastly, a separate, but related, point is that, while Wright focuses on 
associational power, acknowledging its contingence on workers’ structural 
location within the economic system may be crucial for identifying possibilities 
for labour-led social upgrading. 
Critical question marks are also due. Firstly, we have concentrated on the 
question which factors have catalyzed the emergence of the FoA Protocol as a 
VI with the potential to create spaces for labour-led social upgrading. Yet, once 
the time horizon of the case presented in this paper is delimited, the actual 
effectiveness for guaranteeing Indonesian sportswear workers’ collective rights 
will be the lackmus test for the Protocol’s effectiveness – as well as for our 
rather optimistic analysis. Secondly, we implicitly defined workers in the 
Indonesian athletic sportswear industry as those directly employed in 
manufacturers’ plants. A significant number of workers are employed in 
second tier suppliers, though. Despite trade unions’ and their partners’ 
attempts to extend the coverage of the Protocol to second tier producers, these 
efforts were met with resistance. Hence, once we extend the boundaries of our 
unit of analysis, even if effective for directly employed workers, one may 
question whether this VI can be seen as truly contributing to strengthening 
labour. The dualist tendencies that Wright (2000: 999) anticipated as a result of 
positive class compromise, dividing the labour force along the line of 
privileged access to the guarantee of their labour rights, might be present and 
intensified through the Protocol. Thirdly, the sphere of politics might deserve 
more attention. Which role did the Indonesian political class play in the 
emergence of the Protocol? One can hypothesize that Indonesian bureaucrats’ 
greater distance to foreign-owned export producers might have had a role to 
play. As indicated above, in Indonesia, many of the (large) sportswear 
producers are Taiwanese or South Korean. While the Indonesian political class 
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earns significant amounts of money from them, through taxation, but also 
through bribes, still there is a greater degree of distance to productive capital in 
this sector. This is different from the situation in, e.g. India or Sri Lanka. Due 
to the greater degree of state support for manufacturers as their translation of 
being a developmentalist state there, there, capitalists would be far more 
hesitant to sit around the table with unionists. Hence, while the ratification of 
the FoA Protocol can be seen as signaling a move towards greater corporate 
social accountability, characterized by a greater degree of enforceability and 
inclusiveness regarding the actors involved, we are not yet perceiving a greater 
commitment of the Indonesian state to enforce legally guaranteed collective 
labour rights. 
Overall, we have shown that, while the spatial dispersion of production 
has weakened state mechanisms for the guarantee of labour rights, new 
pressure points for labour have also emerged, e.g. brands’ reputation or just-in-
time production. Besides, new possibilities for transnational labour networks 
have opened that strengthen workers’ associational power. Moreover, GVCs 
fragment capital in different factions, such as producers and brands. Their 
material concerns are not necessarily congruent. Workers’ movements might 
be able to benefit from such divergent interests, especially if they are in a 
position to help solving producers and buyers’ collective action problems. We 
conclude that if VIs are to create conditions under which decent work can be 
strengthened, the involvement and strength of local labour organisations is 
required and producers’ and/or buyers’ dependence on workers’ cooperation 
may act as a catalyst. 
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